Recently, discussions have surfaced around the so-called the "Israeli generals' plan" (also referred to as the "Eiland Plan," named after its principal architect and proponent). This plan suggests evacuating the northern Gaza Strip of its civilian population, designating it as a closed military zone, and enforcing a comprehensive blockade, including restrictions on movement and the entry of essential resources like food, fuel, and water. Proponents of the plan argue that these measures are legitimate under international law. The blockade, as envisioned, would be lifted only upon the surrender of Hamas, particularly its military wing. Once surrendered, the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) would face minimal resistance in clearing Gaza City. Similar measures would subsequently be applied to the central Gaza Strip, Rafah, and other areas. Supported by several retired generals, the plan has sparked debate over whether the IDF is actively implementing its provisions.
In light of ongoing developments in Gaza Strip following over a year of intense and bloody conflict and amid the backdrop of the "Israeli generals' plan," I present insights from conversations which I conducted with Brigadier General (Ret.) Zvi Poleg, the first commander of the IDF's Gaza Division, and Giora Eiland, the plan's initiator. My initial discussion with Poleg occurred in August 2022 and focused on the Shimshon undercover unit, which operated int the Gaza Strip from 1986 to 1996. Recently, I sought his updated perspective given the evolving ground situation. My conversation with Eiland, conducted in December 2014, addressed issues of combat and military ethics. Although I haven't revisited Eiland for updated commentary, his positions remain widely accessible through publications like the "Haaretz Supplement." A reexamination of my earlier exchange with Eiland feels pertinent, as the general perception of his stance appears significantly distorted.
Brigadier General (Ret.) Zvi Poleg: Background and Command Experience
Zvi Poleg, born in 1948 in Transylvania, Romania, immigrated to Israel in 1962 with his mother and brother following his father's death. In 1966, he enlisted in the IDF, joining the Golani Brigade. Rising through the ranks, he served in the Six-Day War as a cadet in the 12th Battalion and later commanded various units, including serving as battalion commander from 1976-1977. During the Yom Kippur War, Poleg was wounded in the Golan Heights containment battles. His subsequent roles included leading the 55th Paratrooper Brigade in reserve, participating in Operation Litani, and commanding the Carmeli Brigade during the Lebanon War. Promoted to Brigadier General in 1988, Poleg commanded the Gaza Division during the First Palestinian Intifada and later became Chief of Staff of the Northern Command before retiring in 1992. Following his military service, he served as Netanya's seventh mayor.
Poleg was nominated to lead the Gaza Division by Southern Command Major General Itzik Mordechai in 1988. Mordechai, who assumed his role in 1986, noted to me in an interview the IDF's limited presence in Gaza at the time, with only two small brigade headquarters and a predominantly reserve force supplemented by a single regular Border Guard company. In previous assignments, Mordechai had observed Gaza as a company and battalion commander in the Paratrooper Brigade, but the situation had since evolved. An increase in mosques and public calls from minarets signaled rising activity from radical elements, particularly Islamic Jihad, resulting in escalating violence.
As the Intifada unfolded, Brigadier General Yaakov Or, then commander of Division 80 (Edom), was tasked with overseeing the Gaza Division alongside his existing responsibilities. Gradually, operational forces increased to over 100 companies at their peak.
In August 1988, Poleg succeeded Or as commander, becoming the division's first official leader. During his tenure, the Intifada entered its second year, with the PLO and other factions facing challenges such as diminished civil unrest, declining mass uprisings in Jthe West Bank, and internal violence targeting suspected collaborators. Despite these setbacks, sporadic grenade attacks and improvised explosives grew more frequent, and firearm usage escalated. By early 1990, as Poleg's tenure concluded, mass violent incidents had decreased. However, during his successor Brigadier General Shmuel Zucker's command, the trend shifted towards increased attacks involving firearms, marking the onset of an "Armed Intifada." The Hamas military wing and parallel organizations escalated organized assaults during this period.
With Brigadier General Zvi Poleg's assumption of command over the Gaza Brigade, a strategic decision was made to establish three brigade headquarters (BGH) to streamline operations. These included the northern sector (covering Gaza and the northern Strip), the central sector (focused on the refugee camps in the central area), and the southern sector (encompassing Rafah and Khan Yunis). Each BGH was allocated two battalions, either from regular or reserve forces. On significant occasions, such as special events and days of remembrance, reinforcements were provided with additional battalions, primarily from the Givati and 401 Brigades, and occasionally supplemented by a tank platoon.
Poleg's approach to leadership during this period became evident from a collection of notes and pocket notebooks he meticulously maintained. These documents, which he later entrusted to me, contained ad hoc points for discussions, operational instructions, and directives for building and managing forces. Among these were formal instruction sheets and guidelines distributed to IDF commanders and soldiers at the time. Poleg held the firm belief that "the IDF's operations in the Gaza Strip are a military mission akin to any other assigned to the army. This mission, one of the most complex ever given to the IDF, must be executed without the extensive use of military force, as it involves a civilian population." His responsibilities extended beyond military operations, encompassing oversight of the Civil Administration and police, with the aim of establishing law and order throughout the occupied territories while the Civil Administration focused on managing civilian affairs.
In his briefings, Poleg outlined the IDF's primary objectives in the region: reducing tension and violence, preventing hostile destructive activity (i.e., terror), assisting the Civil Administration, securing the Egyptian border, and protecting Jewish settlements.
He also authored a handwritten paper explaining the broader context of the uprising. In it, he emphasized that "the uprising represents a national and historical conflict over the Land of Israel, driven by the Palestinians' desire to change the territorial status quo and pursue what they perceive as the legitimate rights of their people." He elaborated on the underlying causes, stating: "The uprising was predictable, given the population's perception of living under oppressive conditions while harboring nationalist aspirations. Having been abandoned by neighboring states like Egypt and Jordan, they found themselves alone in their struggle against the formidable State of Israel."
On October 10, 1989, in preparation for a visit to Kibbutz Nir Am – an area where resourceful IDF forces later thwarted a terrorist infiltration attempt on October 7, 2023 – Poleg noted the "difficulty of explaining why children are harmed in conflict." He reflected, "The State of Israel was founded on the moral commitment of the international community following World War II, and expectations of our behavior are held to a higher standard." This perspective was deeply personal for Poleg, whose family endured immense suffering during the Holocaust.
Marking the second anniversary of the Palestinian uprising in the West Bank, Poleg prepared a series of points for discussions with commanders and soldiers. He highlighted the volatile state of the civilian population, warning of spontaneous and uncontrollable reactions fueled by accumulated tensions. Contributing factors included rumors, indiscriminate shooting leading to casualties, inappropriate behavior by soldiers toward holy sites (such as mosques) and women, and instances of humiliation or unnecessary harm. For illustration, he cited specific cases, including "the disgraceful behavior of an IDF military policeman who rudely mistreated Palestinians at the Nahal Oz checkpoint."
During this time, Poleg prioritized refining the rules of engagement. In his operational briefings, he repeatedly stressed the importance of "avoiding harm to civilians" and "eschewing collective punishment." He advocated for punitive actions that allowed for maintaining "bridges for life alongside or even with each other." He explained, "The true measure of mission success lies in the proper functioning of civilian life in the Gaza Strip – schools, healthcare, local governance, and other essential systems."
In the "Chief of Staff's Instructions" issued by Dan Shomron in September 1989, preserved by Brigadier General Zvi Poleg, it was stated: "The IDF faces one of its most complex and sensitive missions, unprecedented in its nature: maintaining law and public order while preventing violent manifestations in the field from achieving their objectives. This mission necessitates the use of force. IDF soldiers must act firmly and decisively, yet with self-control, restraint, and sensitivity, adhering to the high standards expected of IDF soldiers and their commanders. It must be unequivocally understood that the use of force is solely to achieve the mission in accordance with the law and military orders, from which no deviation is permissible. Under no circumstances should force be used as a form of punishment. Whenever force is applied, it must be reasonable and never aimed at intentionally causing bodily harm, such as breaking bones. Furthermore, the use of weapons must strictly adhere to the rules of engagement, along with all related orders and restrictions. No action should be taken against the local population that constitutes abuse, humiliation, or deliberate damage to property—such as swearing, making obscene gestures, or shooting at water heaters." The Chief of Staff concluded: "We will continue to fulfill our mission and overcome the violence directed against us, while upholding, even under challenging circumstances, the principles of law, morality, and discipline upon which we were all raised."
Poleg, who was particularly attuned to the plight of the Palestinian population during his tenure as Gaza Commander, collected a series of postcards featuring children's drawings that depicted their experiences during the First Intifada (see in the title of the spot). These served as a poignant reflection of the broader human impact of the conflict.
Four years after his term as Gaza Commander, in May 1994, Israel withdrew most of its forces from the Gaza Strip as part of the Cairo Agreement, transferring control to the newly established Palestinian Authority. Poleg viewed this withdrawal as necessary, believing there was no justification for Israel's continued presence in Gaza.
During his tenure as Gaza Commander, the Jewish settlement in the area comprised approximately 2,500 people, distributed across 15 communities in Gush Katif and two additional communities in the northern Gaza Strip. In a recent conversation, Poleg noted that, at the time, Jewish settlements controlled one-sixth of the land in the Gaza Strip. He explained that most of the division's forces and resources were allocated to securing these settlements rather than to ongoing or special operations aimed at countering Palestinian violence and terrorism.
In the summer of 2005, under Prime Minister Ariel Sharon's disengagement plan, Israel decided to evacuate the settlements and IDF forces from Gaza and reposition them along the Green Line, transferring full control of the area to the Palestinian Authority. Poleg explained that Sharon had come to the realization – aligned with the military's perspective – that "we have lied to the public for years," and it was time to confront the truth. Sharon recognized the limitations of military power, acknowledging that controlling millions of people in the West Bank did not enhance Israel's security but instead jeopardized it while placing heavy burdens on society and the economy. Poleg similarly opposed isolated settlements in the West Bank, viewing them not as assets but as security liabilities.
Giora Eiland, whose perspectives will be discussed in detail later, also held reservations about the situation. As head of the National Security Council (NSC) at the time, he believed the presence of 8,000 Jews in a densely populated area of the West Bank was problematic. However, he did not see the disengagement plan, which he described as having "weak logic," as the optimal solution. Nonetheless, upon the plan's completion, Eiland informed the Prime Minister that he had reached the conclusion that his ability to influence the process had been exhausted, prompting his resignation from his position.
Major General (Ret.) Giora Eiland: Born in 1952. His father immigrated to Israel from Hungary in 1940, while most of his family perished in the Holocaust. Eiland enlisted in the IDF in August 1970, volunteering for the paratroopers Brigade, and was assigned to Battalion 890. He completed the infantry officer course in April 1972 and returned to the battalion. By August of that year, he was appointed company commander. At the outbreak of the Yom Kippur War, Eiland served as the battalion's operations officer under the command of Yitzhak Mordechai, participating in the pivotal battle at the Chinese Farm. He continued in this role during the War of Attrition in the Syrian enclave. In August 1974, Eiland was appointed company commander within the battalion and later led the support company, which participated in Operation Entebbe in 1976. Following this, he served as a platoon commander in the IDF Officers School of the (Bahad 1), before being appointed Deputy Commander of the 890th Battalion in July 1977. In 1978, he took part in Operation Litani. From 1980 to 1981, he commanded the paratroopers' brigade training base and later the infantry officers' course in Bahad 1, leading the battalion through the First Lebanon War. Between 1982 and 1984, he commanded the Nahal Paratroop Battalion. In 1984, Eiland was appointed as a company officer in the Chief Infantry and Paratroopers Command. By late 1986, he had assumed roles as commander of the IDF Infantry Officers School, instructor in the Company Commanders Course, and commander of the Half Fire Brigade – an elite reserve infantry brigade subordinate to the Fire Brigade, itself part of the Paratroopers and Commando Brigade under the Central Command. From 1990 to 1992, he commanded the commander of the IDF Officers School. From 1992 to 1993, led the Givati Brigade. In 1993, Eiland was appointed head of the Paratroopers and Infantry Corps, un the rank of Brigadier General. In 1996, he was appointed Head of Operations Division in the Operation Directorate, and in 1999 – Head of Operational Directorate un rank of Major General. In this role he was involved in preparations for the IDF withdrawal from Lebanon, and also in conflict with the Palestinians (Second Intifada). In 2001 he was appointed head of the Planning Directorate. Still an army officer, Eiland took part in the political process, during the Israeli-Palestinian peace process, and was appointed to accompany the Foreign Minister Shimon Peres, in his talks with Yasser Arafat. In 2003, he retired from the army, after 33 years of service.
Eiland gained significant public prominence during the Swords of Iron War, largely due to the controversial "Israeli generals' plan," which he initiated and championed. International observers alleged that Israel was effectively implementing the plan without officially adopting it, a claim Israel denied. Human rights organizations and legal experts warned that the plan violated international laws of warfare, raising serious ethical and legal concerns.
In light of these events, Eiland featured prominently on the cover of "Haaretz Supplement" (Ravit Hecht, September 18, 2024). The article introduced him as "a critical figure in this war," describing him as a polarizing symbol. According to the reporter: "In the eyes of the right, he represents the erosion of the left's stance; in the eyes of the left, he embodies moral bankruptcy in the face of the massacre." The piece reflected on how his words captured the shifting dynamics within Israeli consciousness following the massacre, highlighting "the emotional rupture and the collapse of moderation."
I disagree with this statement, because I believe that – unlike Poleg, who was and remains a "leftist" at heart, actively participating in weekly demonstrations against the regime revolution and advocating for the release of the kidnapped – Eiland appears, in my view, to be a "wolf in sheep's clothing," despite his upbringing in a more liberal environment.
Let me begin with a historical perspective: The results of the Second Lebanon War (summer 2006), according to many experts, led to the strengthening of Hezbollah in Lebanon. Although the UN resolution mandated the deployment of the Lebanese army in southern Lebanon and pushed Hezbollah northward, terrorist acts continued. These included rocket fire, anti-tank fire near the border, and other hostilities.
By late 2008, Eiland was already discussing the "Third Lebanon War," proposing that "the way to prevent it, and to win if it occurs, is clear: to make it evident that the next war will be between Israel and Lebanon, not merely Israel and Hezbollah. Such a war would entail the destruction of the Lebanese army, extensive damage to the country's infrastructure, and severe suffering for its population. The scenario where Beirut's citizens enjoy beaches and cafes while Haifa's residents hide in shelters will not recur. Severe harm to Lebanon's infrastructure and the suffering of hundreds of thousands of its people will have the greatest impact on Hezbollah's behavior. We have only two options: risk losing or fight a country that has allowed Hezbollah to control it. We must choose the latter."
This concept, developed after the Second Lebanon War, was formalized as the "Dahiya Doctrine" under Northern Command Major General and later Chief of Staff Gadi Eisenkot. It called for the "disproportionate use of aerial and artillery fire against civilian infrastructure used by terrorist organizations, primarily Hezbollah." The doctrine advocated targeting Hezbollah's "nerve center" in Beirut to inflict maximum damage and deter the group. Regarding the required intensity of force, it argued that "to create effective deterrence, the destruction of civilian infrastructure – both economic and physical – is necessary," on the assumption that this would create a divide between the local population and terrorist organizations.
In late 2009, Eiland reiterated his position: "Israel's clear interest is that if war breaks out, it should be against a state actor that can be deterred – the Lebanese government and its citizens – rather than an organization shielded by state protection." However, this view was not adopted. Instead, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu conveyed a message to Lebanon's citizens during intensified IDF operations, asserting, "Israel's war is not with you; it is with Hezbollah."
Poleg added a critical observation: "Iran is not willing to lose Lebanon, a proxy state serving its regional interests. It supports Hezbollah without alienating Lebanon's elites." Even after the IDF's operations in Lebanon, Hezbollah remained strong enough to retain dominance within the country.
Eiland's narrower assessment was likely considered: "The IDF's most effective action was not the damage inflicted by specific missiles but the massive attack on the Dahiya district," a Shiite suburb in southwestern Beirut and a Hezbollah stronghold. Unlike the situation in Lebanon, the harsh methods of the "Dahiya Doctrine" seem to have been fully implemented in the Gaza Strip after the October 7 massacre.
Here, I offer a unique perspective. In late 2018, my book Martial Law and Ethics (Carmel Publishing – Interpretation and Culture) was published. In order to prepare it I conducted interviews with senior IDF officers, legal experts, and moral philosophers. One extensive conversation occurred with Eiland on December 11, 2014. During this exchange, I presented scenarios based on my experiences as a reserve officer at the Counter-Terrorism School (Lotar) during Operation Protective Edge (July-August 2014). Below are relevant excerpts from my anthropological observation diary documenting this revealing conversation.
Eiland began by stating, "International law is, ultimately, a façade – a pretense; a deceptive exterior that does not reflect reality." He elaborated: "International law is highly political. It is 'so-called' law." While he acknowledged that the principles of international humanitarian law – such as Ftion and proportionality – are "beautiful," he deemed them impractical and overly general, requiring specific adjustments.
Poleg added, "Even if Eiland's observations are accurate, what is permissible for superpowers like the United States is not permissible for Israel. As a small country with limited capabilities, we cannot act as though 'a people that shall dwell alone,' ignoring global public opinion and its political ramifications."
Eiland argued that the application of these principles is inherently political. "The so-called investigation committees write according to international law, but it's all a farce." Reflecting on the First Intifada, during which Poleg served as the first Gaza Commander, Eiland critiqued the detailed opening fire instructions, stating that "they were overly prescriptive." He noted that during the Second Intifada, these instructions were revised as necessary. According to Eiland, soldiers in the field must have significant autonomy: "Instructions should aim for the lowest common denominator."
He acknowledged the inherent dilemma in uncertain situations: "The decision to shoot is a choice between necessity and error." Ultimately, he said, "the outcome of such decisions depends on who is conducting the investigation." Eiland dismissed the idea of a universal moral standard, asserting instead that military actions must be judged comparatively: "We must consider the practices of other armies. To my knowledge, other armies shoot less accurately than we do."
Eiland highlighted the IDF Air Force's use of precision weapons in Gaza, calling it "a reflection of resource allocation," noting that "under normal combat conditions, one should not skimp on ammunition, even if it is inaccurate and inexpensive." He concluded that "the Dahiya operation was highly effective," expressing support for similar strategies in future conflicts.
It is interesting to note that Eiland stated in this conversation, ten years ago, that "the Prime Minister, the Minister of Defense, and the Chief of Staff are one. The political echelon must make military considerations, just as the military echelon must make political considerations." He further asserted, "There is no hierarchy in considerations, despite the fact that the political echelon is in charge."
In his autobiographical book, Can't Sleep at Night (Hebrew, 2018), Eiland wrote: "Only a strategy that produces multiple events of the 'Dahiya effect' type will ensure that campaigns are short, and that Israel emerges victorious." According to him, one possible course of action is "the complete occupation of the entire Gaza Strip, which would serve the broader goal of toppling the Hamas regime." This approach, he argued, "requires the occupation of the entire Gaza Strip and holding it for an extended period, until a different political reality emerges."
Returning to the article in "Haaretz Supplement," Eiland's (relatively moderated) statements reflect his consistent worldview, expressed in the first person: "I give food and water to those who leave and set a certain date, beyond which, whoever decides not to leave does so at their own risk. The entire northern Gaza Strip becomes a military zone, which I can attack because, as far as I'm concerned, only the enemy remains there."
Eiland argued: "All Hamas is trying to do is mix the population with the fighters. All we need to do is the opposite: separate them." He claimed, unfoundedly, that "only terrorists will remain in this area."
On this matter, after conducting an in-depth study of "Military Law and Ethics" (as Knowledge Manager in the Field of Sniping at the Counter-Terrorism School of the IDF, and a member of the Shalom Hartman Institute's Applied Military Ethics Research Team (headed by Prof. Avi Sagi), I have concluded without a doubt that the principle of distinction between combatants and non-combatants or civilians is paramount and non-negotiable. This principle forms the cornerstone of the Law of War. It is imperative to recognize that the distinction between combatants and non-combatants or civilians is obligatory in every situation, at all times. Under no circumstances should we assume that certain areas are devoid of civilians. When operating in civilian environments, it is highly probable that civilians will remain in the vicinity for various reasons. The assumption of "sterile areas" (what Eiland refers to as "clean areas") requires a robust and factual basis. Such assumptions cannot absolve combatants from the responsibility of implementing the principle of distinction. The moral responsibility for ensuring this lies with every commander and every soldier engaged in combat.
Eiland has also spoken explicitly about "starvation" as a military tactic. In the past, he suggested that, after a week, the population in a given area would face the choice of "surrendering or starving." In an interview with "Haaretz Supplement," he expressed regret over this "unfortunate" statement, claiming to have learned from the experience. However, he maintained that "it is permissible and even advisable to starve an enemy population," based on the [incorrect] assumption that this becomes legitimate after civilians are allowed to leave.
Regarding this assumption, the Jewish-American philosopher Michael Walzer, an authority on the ethics of warfare and author of Just and Unjust Wars: A Moral Argument with Historical Illustrations (1977), observed that the American experience during the Vietnam War demonstrates that, even with adequate warnings, many people do not leave. This could be due to age, illness, fear of looting, lack of alternative refuge, or because insurgents deliberately prevent their departure to use them as human shields.
Eiland's analogy of "humanitarian for humanitarian" in such conflicts equates a democratic state's responsibilities with those of a "state" governed by a terrorist organization. His assertion that "the people of Gaza are like the people of Nazi Germany – where the entire population supports the leader" and his comparison of Hamas to a more entrenched force than ISIS are concerning. Such rhetoric risks fueling extremist agendas and poses potential dangers to Israeli society and the state. It is unsurprising that some of Eiland's closest associates have remarked that he has aligned himself with far-right figures like Bezalel Smotrich.
While certain elements on the right championed the adoption of the "Israeli generals' plan" for their own reasons, the Prime Minister faced significant political and diplomatic challenges in navigating these demands. During a meeting with the U.S. Secretary of State in late October 2024, American officials suggested that Israel's isolation of northern Gaza and the withholding of essential supplies constituted harmful policy. Both the Prime Minister and the Minister of Strategic Affairs, Ron Dermer, denied this, asserting: "This is not our policy. The notion that such actions have been implemented has caused us great harm."
Nevertheless, Eiland's controversial remarks have had lasting repercussions. The International Criminal Court (ICC) in The Hague issued a preliminary summary indicating "reasonable basis to assume" that Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and former Defense Minister Yoav Gallant are responsible for "starvation as a method of warfare." The summary alleges that they "intentionally and knowingly deprived the civilian population of Gaza of essential survival equipment, including food, water, medicine, medical supplies, fuel, and electricity." Arrest warrants have been kept secret to protect witnesses and preserve the investigation's integrity.
Zvi Poleg summarized the situation in our recent conversation: "Our continued presence in the West Bank today stems from political, not military, considerations. The IDF has informed the political echelon that its mission in the area is complete. Now is the time to declare a ceasefire and reach an agreement. The primary reason for remaining in the West Bank is the political leverage it offers Prime Minister Netanyahu's coalition, particularly ministers from Otzma Yehudit and Habayit Hayehudi, to maintain his rule. The longer we stay, the more we entangle ourselves in establishing an Israeli control mechanism over the population. Unlike in Lebanon, where the Lebanese government remains responsible for refugees and humanitarian conditions despite our presence, in Gaza, continued Israeli occupation creates a governance vacuum, leaving sole responsibility for the humanitarian crisis on our shoulders."
Regarding the possibility that the situation will be exploited politically to establish Jewish settlements in the Gaza Strip, Poleg acknowledges that the establishment of military infrastructure (such as roads, outposts, etc.) – intended for the army's preparations for its ongoing presence in the area, especially during the winter months – could potentially be used in the future to facilitate the establishment of 'messianic' civilian elements in the region. In his view, if such settlements were established in the near future, they might not pose an immediate security threat, given the severe damage inflicted on terrorist organizations and the substantial IDF presence in the area. However, in the long term, these settlements would face increasing threats and could become a significant burden on the state and the security establishment.
Poleg asserts that "the IDF does not have the appropriate capacity and resources to control the Gaza Strip over time." Regarding the "Israeli generals' plan," he considers it "unrealistic" and believes it "contradicts international law." Poleg argues – as I have also suggested above – that "a democratic state cannot force a population to evacuate and declare a specific area a 'closed military area' indefinitely." He emphasizes the "humanitarian responsibility of an occupying military force toward the civilian population" and highlights the "prohibition against permanently displacing the occupied population."
On the decision of the Hague Criminal Court, Poleg draws a distinction between the responsibility of the political echelon and that of the IDF – a distinction he believes Eiland fails to make. According to Poleg, "When the government does not define its objectives with regard to the Palestinian Authority, refuses to recognize the Palestinian Authority, fails to decide who should govern the Palestinian Authority, and obstructs UNRWA [The United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees] activity – the IDF acts as correctly as possible in accordance with the directives of the political echelon."
He noted that officers in the permanent ranks of the IDF are trained to carry out the instructions of the political echelon without question, to maintain silence, and to execute its orders, out of concern for preserving the democratic structure of government in the country. However, he qualifies this by emphasizing that this does not mean senior IDF officers are mere "yes-men." In closed forums, they candidly present their professional opinions, but once a decision is made, they justify it within the ranks and act accordingly.
In this context, it is noteworthy that Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu's current military secretary, Major General Roman Gofman, holds a different perspective. In an article on "Theatre of Military Leaders", Gofman argued that "the security echelon has a broader responsibility than merely fulfilling tasks defined by the political echelon. A commander must possess strategic vision, influence policymaking, and navigate even in situations where no clear policy has been established."
Dr. Idan Yaron, a sociologist and social anthropologist, specializes in military studies and military ethics, among other areas. His upcoming book (co-authored with Uzi Barzilai and Avi Friedman), The Undercover Unit Samson: Dealing Directly with Wanted Persons in the Gaza Strip, is set to be published soon by Maarachot-Modan.