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The conservative national right  has a complex and, at times, deeply intertwined relationship with religion. In both Europe and the U.S., many far-right groups identify as Christian, either in a broad cultural sense or through affiliation with a particular sect – such as Roman Catholicism—as part of their national identity.   In the U.S., the Christian sect most closely associated with nationalistic Christian ideals is the white evangelical-Protestant  movement. Originating in German- and English-speaking Europe, evangelicalism gradually spread across continents, establishing itself as the dominant expression of Christianity in the U.S. –historically a predominantly Protestant nation – by the 19th century. Today, approximately a quarter of Americans identify as evangelicals. However, less than half of those who claim this identity fully adhere to the core theological tenets of evangelical faith. A significant portion of white evangelicals in the U.S. interpret the world primarily through a conservative Republican political lens, followed by their white racial identity, and only then through their Christian theological beliefs.   Over time, the term evangelical  has become nearly synonymous with Christian conservative  and, more specifically, with white conservative Republican . A landmark national survey revealed that about two-thirds of white evangelicals either support or sympathize with the idea of national Christianity. Some argue that, in the public sphere, evangelicalism's political nature has overshadowed its theological and spiritual essence.   Evangelicals, in a manner reminiscent of the national-religious movement in Israel, advocate for policies that reinforce Christianity's presence in public life. They support the federal government's recognition of the U.S. as a Christian nation, the promotion of Christian values, and the idea that America's success is tied to divine favor. Many also endorse measures such as allowing prayer in public schools. A central theological belief among evangelicals is that America has fallen from greatness and lost God's grace due to its embrace of sinful beliefs and lifestyles. To restore this lost status, they argue, the nation must return to the "right faith" and reinstate traditional ways of life, such as family values rooted in religion and built upon patriarchal, chauvinistic, and white supremacist principles.   Many evangelicals today believe that the U.S. is "God's country." Some see this belief as a call to actively defend Christian culture and maintain the political influence of Christian believers. Research has identified a strong connection between Christian nationalism – an ideology that seeks to merge national and religious identities in a way that grants Christians a privileged status in American society and governance – and racism, xenophobia, misogyny, as well as authoritarian and anti-democratic tendencies. The study also noted a correlation between Christian nationalism and an inclination toward violent extremism.   By mid-2024, approximately 32 percent of voters in the U.S. presidential election identified as evangelicals, with the overwhelming majority leaning toward the right. Some analysts argue that evangelicals represent the most powerful voting bloc in the U.S. today.   Similarly, the religious-nationalist right in Israel  has emerged as the dominant ideological and political force within the broader right-wing spectrum. Many believe that the balance of power between religious nationalism and liberal democracy has shifted dramatically, with the former holding a clear advantage. In this framework, liberal democracy can only persist to the extent that religious nationalism tolerates and allows space for it. As a result, liberal democracy has become the weaker entity –constantly defending itself, justifying its existence, and struggling to maintain its place in the political landscape.   Surveys indicate that an overwhelming majority of Israel's national-religious population leans decisively to the political right. Data shows that 78 percent of this group identifies as right-wing or moderate-right, while only ten percent consider themselves centrist, and a mere three percent align with the left or moderate-left. This rightward tendency is particularly evident in political and security matters, often manifesting in a markedly unequal approach toward non-Jewish populations. Photography: Idan Yaron

Authoritarian populism  is a term that emerged in the mid-nineteenth century and was later popularized by the British Marxist and cultural theorist Stuart Hall. Hall introduced the term to analyze the political transformations occurring in Britain with the rise of Margaret Thatcher in the late 1970s. The term gained traction in the 1980s, particularly among academics studying the policies and political strategies of Thatcher and Ronald Reagan.   The ideological framework of populist-authoritarian movements revolves around three key components: the people, the elite, and the general will ( volonté générale ). These movements claim to represent the will of the people more faithfully than traditional democratic institutions such as legislatures and courts. According to populist ideology, the will of the people is paramount and should supersede institutional checks and balances.   Several contemporary leaders and regimes have been characterized as exhibiting "authoritarian populist" tendencies, including Donald Trump in the United States, Vladimir Putin in Russia, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan in Turkey, Rodrigo Duterte in the Philippines, and Viktor Orbán in Hungary. Their regime styles are marked by a disregard for liberal democratic norms, alongside rhetoric that often includes xenophobia and racism, purportedly aimed at protecting their national identities. This brand of authoritarian populism has been gaining momentum across various European nations as well.   The populist  approach stands in stark contrast to liberal democracy, which is predicated on the idea that a well-structured government must regulate popular will to ensure pluralism and safeguard minority rights. The increasing prevalence and acceptance of authoritarian populist models contribute to the normalization of nationalism, xenophobia, racism, and anti-Semitic rhetoric. Additionally, these trends can incite violent extremism and terrorism. Authoritarian populism  poses a significant threat to democracy and the liberal values that underpin it, both globally and within specific nations, including Israel. The core danger lies in the attempt to replace liberal democracy with an alternative political model – "ethnocracy" or "ethno-nationalism" – where the state is defined as belonging exclusively to a single ethnic group. Anyone who opposes these authoritarian populist regimes risks being labeled a traitor, a despot, or an enemy of the people.   Political scientist Pippa Norris has examined this phenomenon, viewing Donald Trump as a leader who employs populist rhetoric – what she terms "populist demagogy" – to legitimize his leadership while promoting authoritarian values that threaten liberal democratic norms. Similarly, Benjamin Netanyahu has been identified as a leader who utilizes the same rhetorical strategies to advance authoritarian principles. As Norris warned, "The combination of authoritarian values disguised by populist rhetoric is the most dangerous threat to liberal democracy." She further elaborated that "authoritarian values combined with populist rhetoric may fuel a 'cult of fear' – an increase in anxiety rather than security, darkness instead of light." From A Lecture by Federico Finchelstein Fascism   "Of all the unresolved questions of our time, perhaps the most important is: 'What is fascism?'" (George Orwell, 1944)   Although fascist regimes disappeared after World War II, defining the second half of the twentieth century by their absence, this does not mean that fascism as a political force has ceased to exist.   In the twenty-first century, fascism will not manifest in precisely the same form as that seen under Mussolini, Hitler, or Franco. Nor will it necessarily mirror the totalitarian threats of past eras. Instead of searching for exact historical parallels, it is more relevant to examine the underlying ideological patterns that persist.   At its core, fascism represents an uncompromising drive to reclaim the "land of the fathers" for a so-called "reborn" national community. This fundamental characteristic is evident in some contemporary far right – radical and extreme – political movements. Fascism employs rhetoric designed to incite fear and anger as a means of fomenting division and strife among different religious, political, ideological, and ethnic groups. It deliberately targets these groups, directing its full force against them in a relentless struggle. The hallmark policies of fascism include elements such as the invocation of a mythical past, the use of propaganda, a deep-seated anti-intellectualism, a disregard for objective reality, rigid hierarchical structures, a narrative of victimhood, the emphasis on law and order as a tool of control, anxieties surrounding gender and sexuality, and the dismantling of public welfare systems and civic unity.   While the defense of certain individual principles within this framework may at times be legitimate, and even justified, there are historical moments when their convergence within a single political party or movement – such as "Otzma Yehudit" – poses a significant risk. The particular danger of fascist politics stems from the way it systematically leads to the dehumanization of specific segments of the population – whether "Arabs," "leftists," or other marginalized groups. By deliberately excluding these communities from the political and social fabric, fascist ideology erodes the collective ability to empathize with fellow citizens. This, in turn, serves as a justification for the enactment of inhumane policies – ranging from the suppression of fundamental rights and the curtailment of freedom and equality to mass deportations and, in extreme cases, large-scale acts of extermination.   One of the most evident symptoms of fascist politics is the pursuit of segregation. Its fundamental goal is to establish stark distinctions between different groups, framing society in terms of an "us versus them" dynamic – where the "us" (in-group) is deemed inherently superior and the "them" (out-group) is vilified, demonized, or reduced to a status unworthy of rights and protections. To legitimize these divisions, fascist politicians manipulate historical narratives, distorting the collective memory of society by fabricating or mythologizing the past to suit their present-day vision. In doing so, they seek to rewrite the population's shared understanding of reality, twisting the language of political and ideological discourse through propaganda, fostering an anti-intellectual climate, and undermining higher educational institutions and mass media – both of which serve as potential threats to their agenda.   Ultimately, through these calculated techniques, fascist politics engenders a state of perpetual instability, where conspiracy theories and disinformation displace rational discourse and reasoned debate.   The warning signs of this phenomenon are not merely theoretical but are actively manifesting in contemporary societies. We see the early indications – if not the fully realized consequences – of this process unfolding with increasing clarity in the United States, as well as in Israel.   Some theorists argue that when democracy is undermined by right-wing conservative forces – as is increasingly evident in the United States s well as in Israel – it collapses because its foundational elements become intertwined with fascism. When populism adopts authoritarian features, the result is often a regime fundamentally at odds with democratic principles. However, while populism as a whole may be seen as a form of democratic authoritarianism (and thus categorized as a "radical movement"), fascism is inherently a violent dictatorship (and therefore qualifies as an "extremist movement").   As early as the 1930s, the question arose in the United States: "Has fascism come to America?" This concern was notably raised by the American journalist and novelist Sinclair Lewis, recipient of the 1930 Nobel Prize for Literature. In his 1935 novel It Can't Happen Here , Lewis challenged the assumption that America was immune to fascism. His central thesis suggested the opposite: that fascism could  indeed take root in the United States (where "it will be wrapped in the flag and carrying a cross").

Socio-political-religious movements of the far right in Israel place a central emphasis on the messianic aspect – the belief that, at a predetermined moment in history, a descendant of a king will arise and become the Messiah. Maimonides ( Moses ben Maimon , 1138-1204) established this belief as the twelfth of his thirteen principles of faith: " I believe with perfect faith in the coming of the messiah, and though he may tarry, still I await him every day."   In a similar vein, these socio-political movements also relate to the concept of Atchalta De'Geulah  ("the beginning of the redemption") – a term from the Babylonian Talmud that describes the period preceding the ultimate redemption, preparing for the arrival of the Messiah. The fundamental assumption is that redemption will unfold gradually rather than occur instantaneously. This perspective aligns with the Midrash in Kol HaTor  (1:15), a text compiled – according to the descendants of Rabbi Hillel Rivlin of Shklov – based on the teachings of his mentor, the Vilna Gaon (Rabbi Eliijah ben Shlomo Zalman, also known as the Gra). The text reads: " During the period of the footsteps of the  Mashiach, the revelations will begin little by little, like the beginning of the redemption which is compared to the dawn according to our Sages."   The process of redemption necessitates several key developments, which these socio-political movements interpret in their unique framework. One widely accepted belief within these movements is that we are living in an era where "the Land of Israel yields its fruit generously." (Ezekiel 36:8: " But you, mountains of Israel, will produce branches and fruit for my people Israel, for they will soon come home";   Sanhedrin 98a).   Another essential milestone in the process of redemption is the establishment of Jewish sovereignty over the Land of Israel. The renowned Jewish Amora of the first generation, Shmuel of Nehardea, stated: "There is no difference between this world and the days of the Messiah, excepting only the subjugation of kingdoms" (Maimonides, Sanhedrin 91b).   Additionally, these movements emphasize the necessity of restoring the Jewish people's military strength. The Babylonian Talmud, Tractate Megillah (17b)  states: " the war that takes place during the seventh year is also the beginning of the redemption process ."   Only after fulfilling these prerequisites – which still present significant challenges – will it be possible to anticipate the realization of further signs that indicate the full completion of redemption. Among these conditions is the Gathering of Exiles, as described by the Sages: "Just as you left Egypt in 600,000 and entered the land in 600 thousand, so too shall the days of the Messiah be marked by 600 thousand" (Yalkut Shimoni, Hosea 1188). Ultimately, redemption will be fully realized with the fulfillment of the prophetic vision: " At that time they will call Jerusalem The Throne of the Lord, and all nations will gather in Jerusalem to honor the name of the Lord. No longer will they follow the stubbornness of their evil hearts." Photography: Idan Yaron

Terrorism scholar Jessica Stern explained that religious terrorism  arises from pain, loss, and frustration with a God who is perceived as slow to respond to human suffering and does not provide direct answers to the faithful. Adherents of religious terrorism often long for a simpler time – a time when moral distinctions between right and wrong were clear, when society revered heroes and martyrs, and when personal relationships were more intimate. They yearn for a world untainted by the perceived vulgarity of cosmopolitanism, a world that does not humiliate them or threaten their children. In their idealized past, there was no envy of others – perhaps because they were unaware of their existence.   Religious terrorism is rooted in the search for clarity and purpose in an overwhelming world filled with too many choices. It is an attempt to purify the world, reducing moral complexity to a simple and violent equation: kill or be killed. The path forward appears self-evident – kill, and you will be rewarded in heaven; kill, and the Messiah will come. It is a worldview that frames existence in stark contrasts of good and evil, projecting all fears and inadequacies onto the other. Every religious terrorist group believes it is working toward a more perfect world. Convinced of the righteousness of their cause, they justify even the most horrific crimes, assuring themselves that God is on their side.   Yet, despite their efforts, God remains silent. The world remains polluted by injustice and corruption. The perceived enemy continues to oppress its victims. This unresolved tension (cognitive dissonance) breeds rage, which in turn fuels further violence, unless it leads to self-abnegation. In this pursuit of divine justice, the imperative becomes to win at all costs. Thus, the cycle of bloodshed begins.   Unlike national terrorism  – which, although often secular, serves similar functions and may even operate in conjunction with religious terrorism – religious terrorism is carried out by individuals and groups who define themselves, and are defined by their environment, as religious. They justify their actions using religious language, invoke sacred symbols, and align their motivations with religious values and norms.   The rise of religious terrorism – especially within movements such as Al-Qaeda, which emerged in the early 1990s – introduced a new dimension to modern Islamic extremism. This ideology embraces continuous jihad and unrelenting self-sacrifice, utilizing terrorism as a strategic means to achieve its vision. In this context, idealistic young people (such as the Hilltop Youth in the Israeli context) become willing to sacrifice themselves to hasten redemption. Their readiness to die for the sanctification of God presents a unique challenge in counterterrorism efforts, making engagement with such individuals and groups particularly difficult.   Religion provides moral justification for terrorism, embedding acts of violence within a larger cosmic struggle. It allows terrorists to perceive themselves as warriors engaged in a divine battle, shaping their actions through the lens of sacred narratives. In doing so, religion lends symbolic significance to bloodshed, transforming even the most catastrophic acts of terrorism into perceived sacred duties. Photography: Idan Yaron

"Germany above all" (Deutschland über Alles) was a nationalist slogan that appeared in the anthem of Nazi Germany, set to the tune composed by Joseph Haydn. Due to the horrors of Nazism – particularly the Holocaust – we are naturally cautious about drawing comparisons to that dark period in history. However, it is difficult to ignore the ideological proximity between the beliefs of extreme right-wing circles in both the United States and Israel and the ideology that was prevalent in Germany at the time.   One of the clearest modern parallels is white supremacy  in the United States. White supremacy is a systemic structure that upholds, protects, and assigns value to individuals with "white" skin while simultaneously controlling, silencing, and devaluing "non-whites." Unlike civic nationalism  – which maintains that a nation can be multiracial and multicultural, unified by shared laws and values – white nationalism  insists that true nationhood is inherently defined by race and ethnicity. Members of violent extremist groups, whether white supremacists or radical Islamists, believe that brutal violence against civilians is not only necessary but justified. They adopt an authoritarian worldview and pursue ideological goals through coercion and aggression.   The U.S. Task Force for Countering Violent Extremism (generally grasped as ideologically, religious, or politically motivated acts of violence) defined White Supremacist Extremists  (WSE) as "individuals who seek, wholly or in part, through unlawful acts of force or violence, to support their belief in the intellectual and moral superiority of the white race over other races… WSE violence often targets racial, ethnic, and religious minorities, as well as government and law enforcement official."   White nationalism in the United States encompasses a network of organizations, ideologues, theological interpretations, and – most significantly – a deeply entrenched cultural belief system that functions almost as a form of religion. This worldview, both militant and non-militant, legitimizes and glorifies white racial and ethnic identity. It portrays whiteness not only as superior to all other identities but as an existential pillar of the nation itself. Consequently, all other racial and ethnic identities are perceived as threats to the very existence of the white supremacist movement. At its most extreme, white supremacy is driven by the conviction that it must protect what its adherents perceive as the white race from cultural and racial genocide in an impending racial war. Many white nationalists believe that this war has already begun. In their ideology, violence is not just a means of survival but the primary tool for establishing what they perceive as truth and justice.   A parallel ideological movement – Jewish supremacy  – exists within certain factions in Israel. These groups promote the idea that Jews, by their very nature, are superior in value to "other" nationalities, religions, races, or ethnic minorities, particularly Arabs or Ishmaelites. Under this ideology, those who are officially classified as Jews are deemed inherently entitled to rule over "others." This belief system frames Jewish identity – not only in religious terms but as a racial and national hierarchy – as the pinnacle of humanity.   The historical construction of Jewish identity serves as the foundation for the ideology of Jewish supremacy. This ideology manipulates race, nationhood, and religion to create divisions and justify economic, political, and social exclusion. It grants the collective, as well as individual members of the dominant group, specific privileges and advantages. Israeli society is deeply stratified, and its inequalities are largely structured along racial-national-religious lines. This ideology permeates all aspects of Israeli institutions, including the economy, political systems, law enforcement, judicial structures, education, and healthcare. Israeli culture is embedded with beliefs, values, norms, and symbols that reinforce Jewish supremacy.   At the heart of this culture lies a system of separation – most notably, the distinction between Jews and non-Jews in general, and Arabs in particular. Ultimately, Jewish supremacy in Israel functions as a historical mechanism of exploitation, control, and oppression. It exists to concentrate wealth (such as land and other assets), prestige, and power within a specific demographic group while marginalizing others.   In practical terms, what many in Israel refer to as Jewishness is, in effect, a racial construct. It is shaped by a socio-historical process in which racial, national, and religious classifications evolve over time due to shifting social, economic, and political forces. This construct functions as a system of social control, shaping both individual and collective identity.   A common definition of racism  is an interpersonal attitude rooted in the belief that certain groups are inherently different – either superior or inferior – compared to "others." This belief manifests in the attitudes, actions, and expressions of individuals who uphold and reinforce the supremacist ideology.   Judaism, as framed by this supremacist ideology, rhetorically dissolves internal social differences within the Jewish community while fostering the illusion that all "Jews" share a stronger common bond than the sum of their internal distinctions.   In societies where Judaism is the dominant social framework – such as Israel – it serves as the primary standard against which all other social structures are defined and measured. The history of Judaism in Israel is rife with instances in which non-Jewish groups, particularly Arabs, have been used as comparative benchmarks, reinforcing the idea that no matter an individual's status within Jewish society, they remain superior to the gentile or Arab population. This hierarchical distinction has been strategically leveraged to secure special rights and privileges for Jews at the expense of non-Jews.   Like white supremacy in the United States, Jewish supremacy in Israel has evolved into a political phenomenon. It is deeply embedded in the power struggles between the state and civil society, as well as among different factions within the Jewish community itself. It dictates key social and political decisions, including for instance: who can marry whom; who can live where; who can work where. These decisions, in turn, shape all aspects of daily life. The classification of an individual as a Jew directly influences their opportunities, affecting not only their survival but also their ability to thrive, prosper, and achieve well-being.   As a political phenomenon, the ideology of Jewish supremacy is closely linked to a fundamental misconception of majority rule  – interpreting it as the core principle of democracy while disregarding the essential distinction in constitutional political theory. In democratic governance, majority rule  refers to a political majority , one that can shift from election to election. It does not refer to a fixed ethno-religious majority , perceived in organic terms, that seeks to entrench and preserve itself through laws (such as the Basic Law: Israel as the Nation-State of the Jewish People, 2018 ), institutions, and demographic policies. This interpretation is fundamentally at odds with the nature and function of a majority within a true democratic system.   Given how deeply contentious and politically charged the debate over Jewish identity is, it is unsurprising that conspiracy theories about its future have emerged. Two such theories – both originating in the United States – have become embedded in the ideology and consciousness of activists within Israel's far-right movements, particularly among the most radical and extremist factions: the theory of genocide (Holocaust) , and the  Great Replacement  theory. Both theories are based on the premise that the Jewish people face an existential threat.   The notion of an impending Holocaust was central to Rabbi Meir Kahane’s ideology, encapsulated in the slogan: “Never Again.”  This theory asserts that the survival of the Jewish people is endangered by a range of social and cultural phenomena, including secularization, Westernization, and assimilation. These forces are seen as eroding Jewish identity and continuity, ultimately leading to demographic and ideological decline.   The Great Replacement  theory, a concept found in various nationalist and supremacist movements worldwide, also plays a significant role in far-right Jewish extremism. This theory was a key concern for Rabbi Kahane, particularly in the context of Israel's demographic problem . He advocated for policies aimed at increasing the Jewish birth rate and encouraging mass immigration of Jews from the Diaspora to counterbalance demographic shifts.   According to this theory, the combination of rising birth rates among non-Jews, increasing numbers of migrant workers and asylum seekers, and relatively low birth rates within the Jewish population will inevitably result in the replacement of the Jewish majority with a non-Jewish majority.   At its core, the idea of replacement  stems from the fear that marginalized or opposing groups (such as Black communities in the United States or Arab communities in Israel) will supplant the dominant hegemonic groups (such as white populations in the U.S. or Jewish populations in Israel). This politics of replacement  is especially evident in the Kahanist movement, which integrates conspiracy-driven demographic concerns with exclusionary policies. The belief is that the national population is at risk of persecution or even eradication by defined others .   Ideologies that support Jewish supremacy have fueled the rise of Jewish rage  movements, such as Otzma Yehudit, which seek to suppress the aspirations, demands, and social progress of non-Jewish populations. This is achieved through various means, including: legislation that discriminates against non-Jews; restrictive policies that limit their rights and freedoms; systemic oppression through legal, economic, and social measures.   In addition to political and institutional discrimination, these movements also contribute to the growth of hate groups , which in turn intensify patterns of violent extremism , hate crimes , and vigilante terrorism . It is crucial to recognize that at the core of all forms of terrorism lies a foundation of hatred. Every organized hate group, regardless of its ideological orientation, is characterized by beliefs or practices that incite hostility, violence, or aggression toward an entire population group or groups. Photography: Idan Yaron

Liberals value liberty; however, so do illiberals, including conservatives. Almost all modern opponents of liberalism claim to support liberty, though their interpretations of the concept often differ greatly. As a result, liberty cannot serve as a definitive criterion for distinguishing between political camps.   In my view, the issues of equality and inequality are more central and diagnostic in differentiating ideologies. These matters remain unresolved at both national and international levels. The French economist Thomas Piketty highlighted that every human society must justify the inequalities that arise within it. Without justification, the political and social structure risks collapse. Consequently, each era and society develops competing discourses and ideologies to legitimize existing inequalities or those deemed necessary.   Inequality is fundamentally an ideological and political issue, rather than merely an economic or technological one. Social, economic, and political rules emerge from these ideological discourses, giving meaning to the surrounding social structure.   Historically, equality was not always considered a universal value. Aristotle argued that equals should be treated equally and unequals unequally. Similarly, socio-political thinkers like Thomas Hobbes, John Locke, and Jean-Jacques Rousseau believed that while equality might represent the natural state of humanity, it could coexist with significant social inequalities. Even Immanuel Kant supported inequality when he considered it justified.   The core issue surrounding equality lies in the assertion that all human beings are equal in their shared humanity – and in that respect alone. As humans, no one is more or less human than another. However, individuals may differ in the extent to which they possess qualities common to humanity. Recognizing that all humans are personally equal in their humanity implies they are entitled to circumstantial equality – at least in terms of equality of opportunity.   In modern political discourse, a key distinction between the conservative-right and the liberal-left concerns their valuation of equality and inequality. The conservative-right views equality as an unattainable or even undesirable goal and works to preserve or amplify inequality' while the liberal-left advocates for equality and actively seeks to promote it.   More specifically, some argue that liberal socialists value both equality and liberty; capitalist conservatives prioritize liberty alone; communists value equality exclusively; and fascists value neither liberty nor equality.   Voltaire, the Enlightenment philosopher, insightfully remarked that "equality is the most natural thing and at the same time the most imaginary." Similarly, Norberto Bobbio differentiated between the right and left based on their attitudes toward equality: the right perceives inequality as natural and beneficial, believing the state should protect or preserve it, while the left regards inequality as artificial and harmful, striving to overcome it through an active state.   Piketty posits that ideas and ideologies hold historical significance, enabling us to envision new societal models and distinguish between potential social structures. His perspective challenges the conservative argument, which often assumes inequality has a "natural" basis. Piketty argues that elites in many societies strive to present inequality as a natural phenomenon. Unlike the Marxist approach, which sees economic forces and production relations as mechanically determining a society's ideological "superstructure," Piketty asserts that the political-ideological realm has its own autonomy.   Equality among human beings is essential to understanding the emergence of the left in history. The liberal left tradition is anchored in several fundamental values, chief among them being the principle of equality – a belief in the inherent equality of all humans.   The Enlightenment most clearly articulated the modern concept of equality. This era rejected religious justifications for equality, such as the belief that “all men are created in the image of God” or stem from a common father. Instead, equality was grounded in the idea that every individual possesses reason, a tool enabling them to think, evaluate, and decide autonomously. Enlightenment thinkers argued that men are equal not only in their intelligence but also in their rights. As rational beings, all people have equal moral value, dignity, and entitlement to rights. Liberalism, as a tradition, strives for egalitarian goals where equality of opportunity aligns with equality of outcomes.   In contrast, conservative right-wing movements often center around the axiom of inequality in human society. They do not advocate equality among individuals, nations, or citizens. Instead, they tend to favor some form of "ethnic nationalism," which inherently opposes the liberal emphasis on universal equality.   Equality, according to right-wing ideologies in general, is often seen as the Trojan horse of liberalism. The right, therefore, rejects the Enlightenment and liberal concept that humans are born equal. Its adherents frequently subscribe to the principles of social Darwinism. This perspective is exemplified in the words of Walter Gross, head of the Nazi Office for Enlightenment on Population Policy and Racial Welfare, who declared in 1939 that "no agreement is possible with the international intellectual systems, because they are not faithful to the truth, and are not fair. They are based on an unbelievable lie, namely that of equality between human beings."   This fundamental difference in axioms has far-reaching implications across various aspects of life, most notably in the treatment of the "other" and the formulation of attitudes toward them. Today, inequality seems to be the accepted default, forming part of a new paradigm that dominates our cultural horizon. Society faces a "crisis of equality," reflecting a shift in the balance of power between the radical, extremist right and the progressive left. When the former gains dominance, challenges to human equality become pervasive, and its violation normalized in practice.   Those who choose to undermine fundamental social and state values effectively exclude themselves from the democratic framework. When an individual, group, or movement adopts criteria such as culture, religion, nationality, race, gender, or skin color to distinguish between "us" and "them" – and institutionalizes these distinctions within a hierarchical system – they embrace racism as a way of life. Such an anti-liberal approach, epitomized by racism, cannot coexist with a democratic regime, just as democracy cannot coexist with incitement, violent extremism, or terrorism.   The harm caused by the establishment of right-wing, radical, religious-nationalist ideologies – and particularly extremist views – represents a grave threat to the humanistic, democratic foundations of trust, consensus, and social cohesion. This is especially true in diverse societies, such as the State of Israel, where a complex social mosaic necessitates shared values. The value of equality is indispensable in such societies, serving as a cornerstone of the multicultural framework. This framework seeks to ensure the protection of the rights of individuals and groups outside the hegemonic majority, including their rights to culture, religion, language, housing, and other fundamental aspects of life.   This situation mirrors developments in the United States, as well as in Israel. Although the founders of Israel declared that the future state would treat all its residents equally, "regardless of religion, race, and gender," this vision faced opposition from certain sectors of Israeli society from the very beginning. Over the years, this opposition has grown more pronounced. For instance, Rabbi Meir Kahane explicitly argued that there is an irreconcilable contradiction between a Jewish state and a state in which Arabs and Jews have equal rights. According to his view, equal rights for all citizens and the Jewish character of the state are mutually exclusive.   One of the most prominent legal expressions of efforts to "break equality" in Israel is the Basic Law: Israel – The Nation-State of the Jewish People (2018). This law notably omits any reference to the value of "equality" or the preservation of democracy. It disregards the principles outlined in Israel's Declaration of Independence, which promised equal rights to all citizens of the state. Furthermore, the law fails to include the phrase "Jewish and democratic," effectively sidelining one of the core values that had been foundational to Israel's national ethos. Photography: Idan Yaron

"Biden is gone, and we are returning to vigorous activity... Thank God, with the new administration in the United States, President Trump has made a significant decision to lift the sanctions imposed by the previous administration. Thanks to this decision, by the grace of God, all restrictions have been removed, allowing us to resume our activities with full vigor… Donations are encouraged and come with the blessings of the esteemed Gaon Rabbi Dov Lior (widely regarded as the spiritual leader of the Otzma Yehudit Party), the late Rabbi Mordechai Eliyahu (who passed away in 2010), and Rabbi Yehuda Kreuzer (Head of the Yeshiva of the Jewish Idea [ Yeshiva HaRaayon HaYehu ] established by Rabbi Meir Kahane)."   After the passing of Rabbi Meir Kahane, and the passing of President Joe Biden, the "phoenix" re-created itself from the ashes. In Accordance with Section 27A of the Copyright Law

Recently, discussions have surfaced around the so-called the "Israeli generals' plan " (also referred to as the "Eiland Plan," named after its principal architect and proponent). This plan suggests evacuating the northern Gaza Strip of its civilian population, designating it as a closed military zone, and enforcing a comprehensive blockade, including restrictions on movement and the entry of essential resources like food, fuel, and water. Proponents of the plan argue that these measures are legitimate under international law. The blockade, as envisioned, would be lifted only upon the surrender of Hamas, particularly its military wing. Once surrendered, the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) would face minimal resistance in clearing Gaza City. Similar measures would subsequently be applied to the central Gaza Strip, Rafah, and other areas. Supported by several retired generals, the plan has sparked debate over whether the IDF is actively implementing its provisions.   In light of ongoing developments in Gaza Strip following over a year of intense and bloody conflict and amid the backdrop of the " Israeli generals' plan ," I present insights from conversations which I conducted with Brigadier General (Ret.) Zvi Poleg, the first commander of the IDF's Gaza Division, and Giora Eiland, the plan's initiator. My initial discussion with Poleg occurred in August 2022 and focused on the Shimshon undercover unit, which operated int the Gaza Strip from 1986 to 1996. Recently, I sought his updated perspective given the evolving ground situation. My conversation with Eiland, conducted in December 2014, addressed issues of combat and military ethics. Although I haven't revisited Eiland for updated commentary, his positions remain widely accessible through publications like the "Haaretz Supplement." A reexamination of my earlier exchange with Eiland feels pertinent, as the general perception of his stance appears significantly distorted.   Brigadier General (Ret.) Zvi Poleg: Background and Command Experience Zvi Poleg, born in 1948 in Transylvania, Romania, immigrated to Israel in 1962 with his mother and brother following his father's death. In 1966, he enlisted in the IDF, joining the Golani Brigade. Rising through the ranks, he served in the Six-Day War as a cadet in the 12th Battalion and later commanded various units, including serving as battalion commander from 1976-1977. During the Yom Kippur War, Poleg was wounded in the Golan Heights containment battles. His subsequent roles included leading the 55th Paratrooper Brigade in reserve, participating in Operation Litani, and commanding the Carmeli Brigade during the Lebanon War. Promoted to Brigadier General in 1988, Poleg commanded the Gaza Division during the First Palestinian Intifada and later became Chief of Staff of the Northern Command before retiring in 1992. Following his military service, he served as Netanya's seventh mayor.   Poleg was nominated to lead the Gaza Division by Southern Command Major General Itzik Mordechai in 1988. Mordechai, who assumed his role in 1986, noted to me in an interview the IDF's limited presence in Gaza at the time, with only two small brigade headquarters and a predominantly reserve force supplemented by a single regular Border Guard company. In previous assignments, Mordechai had observed Gaza as a company and battalion commander in the Paratrooper Brigade, but the situation had since evolved. An increase in mosques and public calls from minarets signaled rising activity from radical elements, particularly Islamic Jihad, resulting in escalating violence.   As the Intifada unfolded, Brigadier General Yaakov Or, then commander of Division 80 ( Edom ), was tasked with overseeing the Gaza Division alongside his existing responsibilities. Gradually, operational forces increased to over 100 companies at their peak.   In August 1988, Poleg succeeded Or as commander, becoming the division's first official leader. During his tenure, the Intifada entered its second year, with the PLO and other factions facing challenges such as diminished civil unrest, declining mass uprisings in Jthe West Bank, and internal violence targeting suspected collaborators. Despite these setbacks, sporadic grenade attacks and improvised explosives grew more frequent, and firearm usage escalated. By early 1990, as Poleg's tenure concluded, mass violent incidents had decreased. However, during his successor Brigadier General Shmuel Zucker's command, the trend shifted towards increased attacks involving firearms, marking the onset of an "Armed Intifada." The Hamas military wing and parallel organizations escalated organized assaults during this period.   With Brigadier General Zvi Poleg's assumption of command over the Gaza Brigade, a strategic decision was made to establish three brigade headquarters (BGH) to streamline operations. These included the northern sector (covering Gaza and the northern Strip), the central sector (focused on the refugee camps in the central area), and the southern sector (encompassing Rafah and Khan Yunis). Each BGH was allocated two battalions, either from regular or reserve forces. On significant occasions, such as special events and days of remembrance, reinforcements were provided with additional battalions, primarily from the Givati and 401 Brigades, and occasionally supplemented by a tank platoon.   Poleg's approach to leadership during this period became evident from a collection of notes and pocket notebooks he meticulously maintained. These documents, which he later entrusted to me, contained ad hoc points for discussions, operational instructions, and directives for building and managing forces. Among these were formal instruction sheets and guidelines distributed to IDF commanders and soldiers at the time. Poleg held the firm belief that "the IDF's operations in the Gaza Strip are a military mission akin to any other assigned to the army. This mission, one of the most complex ever given to the IDF, must be executed without the extensive use of military force, as it involves a civilian population." His responsibilities extended beyond military operations, encompassing oversight of the Civil Administration and police, with the aim of establishing law and order throughout the occupied territories while the Civil Administration focused on managing civilian affairs.   In his briefings, Poleg outlined the IDF's primary objectives in the region: reducing tension and violence, preventing hostile destructive activity (i.e., terror), assisting the Civil Administration, securing the Egyptian border, and protecting Jewish settlements.   He also authored a handwritten paper explaining the broader context of the uprising. In it, he emphasized that "the uprising represents a national and historical conflict over the Land of Israel, driven by the Palestinians' desire to change the territorial status quo and pursue what they perceive as the legitimate rights of their people." He elaborated on the underlying causes, stating: "The uprising was predictable, given the population's perception of living under oppressive conditions while harboring nationalist aspirations. Having been abandoned by neighboring states like Egypt and Jordan, they found themselves alone in their struggle against the formidable State of Israel."   On October 10, 1989, in preparation for a visit to Kibbutz Nir Am – an area where resourceful IDF forces later thwarted a terrorist infiltration attempt on October 7, 2023 – Poleg noted the "difficulty of explaining why children are harmed in conflict." He reflected, "The State of Israel was founded on the moral commitment of the international community following World War II, and expectations of our behavior are held to a higher standard." This perspective was deeply personal for Poleg, whose family endured immense suffering during the Holocaust.   Marking the second anniversary of the Palestinian uprising in the West Bank, Poleg prepared a series of points for discussions with commanders and soldiers. He highlighted the volatile state of the civilian population, warning of spontaneous and uncontrollable reactions fueled by accumulated tensions. Contributing factors included rumors, indiscriminate shooting leading to casualties, inappropriate behavior by soldiers toward holy sites (such as mosques) and women, and instances of humiliation or unnecessary harm. For illustration, he cited specific cases, including "the disgraceful behavior of an IDF military policeman who rudely mistreated Palestinians at the Nahal Oz checkpoint."   During this time, Poleg prioritized refining the rules of engagement. In his operational briefings, he repeatedly stressed the importance of "avoiding harm to civilians" and "eschewing collective punishment." He advocated for punitive actions that allowed for maintaining "bridges for life alongside or even with each other." He explained, "The true measure of mission success lies in the proper functioning of civilian life in the Gaza Strip – schools, healthcare, local governance, and other essential systems."   In the "Chief of Staff's Instructions" issued by Dan Shomron in September 1989, preserved by Brigadier General Zvi Poleg, it was stated: "The IDF faces one of its most complex and sensitive missions, unprecedented in its nature: maintaining law and public order while preventing violent manifestations in the field from achieving their objectives. This mission necessitates the use of force. IDF soldiers must act firmly and decisively, yet with self-control, restraint, and sensitivity, adhering to the high standards expected of IDF soldiers and their commanders. It must be unequivocally understood that the use of force is solely to achieve the mission in accordance with the law and military orders, from which no deviation is permissible. Under no circumstances should force be used as a form of punishment. Whenever force is applied, it must be reasonable and never aimed at intentionally causing bodily harm, such as breaking bones. Furthermore, the use of weapons must strictly adhere to the rules of engagement, along with all related orders and restrictions. No action should be taken against the local population that constitutes abuse, humiliation, or deliberate damage to property—such as swearing, making obscene gestures, or shooting at water heaters." The Chief of Staff concluded: "We will continue to fulfill our mission and overcome the violence directed against us, while upholding, even under challenging circumstances, the principles of law, morality, and discipline upon which we were all raised."   Poleg, who was particularly attuned to the plight of the Palestinian population during his tenure as Gaza Commander, collected a series of postcards featuring children's drawings that depicted their experiences during the First Intifada (see in the title of the spot). These served as a poignant reflection of the broader human impact of the conflict.   Four years after his term as Gaza Commander, in May 1994, Israel withdrew most of its forces from the Gaza Strip as part of the Cairo Agreement, transferring control to the newly established Palestinian Authority. Poleg viewed this withdrawal as necessary, believing there was no justification for Israel's continued presence in Gaza.   During his tenure as Gaza Commander, the Jewish settlement in the area comprised approximately 2,500 people, distributed across 15 communities in Gush Katif and two additional communities in the northern Gaza Strip. In a recent conversation, Poleg noted that, at the time, Jewish settlements controlled one-sixth of the land in the Gaza Strip. He explained that most of the division's forces and resources were allocated to securing these settlements rather than to ongoing or special operations aimed at countering Palestinian violence and terrorism.   In the summer of 2005, under Prime Minister Ariel Sharon's disengagement plan, Israel decided to evacuate the settlements and IDF forces from Gaza and reposition them along the Green Line, transferring full control of the area to the Palestinian Authority. Poleg explained that Sharon had come to the realization – aligned with the military's perspective – that "we have lied to the public for years," and it was time to confront the truth. Sharon recognized the limitations of military power, acknowledging that controlling millions of people in the West Bank did not enhance Israel's security but instead jeopardized it while placing heavy burdens on society and the economy. Poleg similarly opposed isolated settlements in the West Bank, viewing them not as assets but as security liabilities.   Giora Eiland, whose perspectives will be discussed in detail later, also held reservations about the situation. As head of the National Security Council (NSC) at the time, he believed the presence of 8,000 Jews in a densely populated area of the West Bank was problematic. However, he did not see the disengagement plan, which he described as having "weak logic," as the optimal solution. Nonetheless, upon the plan's completion, Eiland informed the Prime Minister that he had reached the conclusion that his ability to influence the process had been exhausted, prompting his resignation from his position.   Major General (Ret.) Giora Eiland : Born in 1952. His father immigrated to Israel from Hungary in 1940, while most of his family perished in the Holocaust. Eiland enlisted in the IDF in August 1970, volunteering for the paratroopers Brigade, and was assigned to Battalion 890. He completed the infantry officer course in April 1972 and returned to the battalion. By August of that year, he was appointed company commander. At the outbreak of the Yom Kippur War, Eiland served as the battalion's operations officer under the command of Yitzhak Mordechai, participating in the pivotal battle at the Chinese Farm. He continued in this role during the War of Attrition in the Syrian enclave. In August 1974, Eiland was appointed company commander within the battalion and later led the support company, which participated in Operation Entebbe in 1976. Following this, he served as a platoon commander in the IDF Officers School of the ( Bahad  1), before being appointed Deputy Commander of the 890th Battalion in July 1977. In 1978, he took part in Operation Litani. From 1980 to 1981, he commanded the paratroopers' brigade training base and later the infantry officers' course in Bahad  1, leading the battalion through the First Lebanon War. Between 1982 and 1984, he commanded the Nahal Paratroop Battalion. In 1984, Eiland was appointed as a company officer in the Chief Infantry and Paratroopers Command. By late 1986, he had assumed roles as commander of the IDF Infantry Officers School, instructor in the Company Commanders Course, and commander of the Half Fire Brigade – an elite reserve infantry brigade subordinate to the Fire Brigade, itself part of the Paratroopers and Commando Brigade under the Central Command. From 1990 to 1992, he commanded the commander of the IDF Officers School. From 1992 to 1993, led the Givati Brigade. In 1993, Eiland was appointed head of the Paratroopers and Infantry Corps, un the rank of Brigadier General. In 1996, he was appointed Head of Operations Division in the Operation Directorate, and in 1999 – Head of Operational Directorate un rank of Major General. In this role he was involved in preparations for the IDF withdrawal from Lebanon, and also in conflict with the Palestinians (Second Intifada). In 2001 he was appointed head of the Planning Directorate. Still an army officer, Eiland took part in the political process, during the Israeli-Palestinian peace process, and was appointed to accompany the Foreign Minister Shimon Peres, in his talks with Yasser Arafat. In 2003, he retired from the army, after 33 years of service.   Eiland gained significant public prominence during the Swords of Iron War, largely due to the controversial " Israeli generals' plan ," which he initiated and championed. International observers alleged that Israel was effectively implementing the plan without officially adopting it, a claim Israel denied. Human rights organizations and legal experts warned that the plan violated international laws of warfare, raising serious ethical and legal concerns.   In light of these events, Eiland featured prominently on the cover of "Haaretz Supplement" (Ravit Hecht, September 18, 2024). The article introduced him as "a critical figure in this war," describing him as a polarizing symbol. According to the reporter: "In the eyes of the right, he represents the erosion of the left's stance; in the eyes of the left, he embodies moral bankruptcy in the face of the massacre." The piece reflected on how his words captured the shifting dynamics within Israeli consciousness following the massacre, highlighting "the emotional rupture and the collapse of moderation."   I disagree with this statement, because I believe that – unlike Poleg, who was and remains a "leftist" at heart, actively participating in weekly demonstrations against the regime revolution and advocating for the release of the kidnapped – Eiland appears, in my view, to be a "wolf in sheep's clothing," despite his upbringing in a more liberal environment.   Let me begin with a historical perspective: The results of the Second Lebanon War (summer 2006), according to many experts, led to the strengthening of Hezbollah in Lebanon. Although the UN resolution mandated the deployment of the Lebanese army in southern Lebanon and pushed Hezbollah northward, terrorist acts continued. These included rocket fire, anti-tank fire near the border, and other hostilities.   By late 2008, Eiland was already discussing the "Third Lebanon War," proposing that "the way to prevent it, and to win if it occurs, is clear: to make it evident that the next war will be between Israel and Lebanon, not merely Israel and Hezbollah. Such a war would entail the destruction of the Lebanese army, extensive damage to the country's infrastructure, and severe suffering for its population. The scenario where Beirut's citizens enjoy beaches and cafes while Haifa's residents hide in shelters will not recur. Severe harm to Lebanon's infrastructure and the suffering of hundreds of thousands of its people will have the greatest impact on Hezbollah's behavior. We have only two options: risk losing or fight a country that has allowed Hezbollah to control it. We must choose the latter."   This concept, developed after the Second Lebanon War, was formalized as the "Dahiya Doctrine" under Northern Command Major General and later Chief of Staff Gadi Eisenkot. It called for the "disproportionate use of aerial and artillery fire against civilian infrastructure used by terrorist organizations, primarily Hezbollah." The doctrine advocated targeting Hezbollah's "nerve center" in Beirut to inflict maximum damage and deter the group. Regarding the required intensity of force, it argued that "to create effective deterrence, the destruction of civilian infrastructure – both economic and physical – is necessary," on the assumption that this would create a divide between the local population and terrorist organizations.   In late 2009, Eiland reiterated his position: "Israel's clear interest is that if war breaks out, it should be against a state actor that can be deterred – the Lebanese government and its citizens – rather than an organization shielded by state protection." However, this view was not adopted. Instead, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu conveyed a message to Lebanon's citizens during intensified IDF operations, asserting, "Israel's war is not with you; it is with Hezbollah."   Poleg added a critical observation: "Iran is not willing to lose Lebanon, a proxy state serving its regional interests. It supports Hezbollah without alienating Lebanon's elites." Even after the IDF's operations in Lebanon, Hezbollah remained strong enough to retain dominance within the country.   Eiland's narrower assessment was likely considered: "The IDF's most effective action was not the damage inflicted by specific missiles but the massive attack on the Dahiya district," a Shiite suburb in southwestern Beirut and a Hezbollah stronghold. Unlike the situation in Lebanon, the harsh methods of the "Dahiya Doctrine" seem to have been fully implemented in the Gaza Strip after the October 7 massacre.   Here, I offer a unique perspective. In late 2018, my book Martial Law and Ethics  (Carmel Publishing – Interpretation and Culture) was published. In order to prepare it I conducted interviews with senior IDF officers, legal experts, and moral philosophers. One extensive conversation occurred with Eiland on December 11, 2014. During this exchange, I presented scenarios based on my experiences as a reserve officer at the Counter-Terrorism School ( Lotar ) during Operation Protective Edge (July-August 2014). Below are relevant excerpts from my anthropological observation diary documenting this revealing conversation.   Eiland began by stating, "International law is, ultimately, a façade – a pretense; a deceptive exterior that does not reflect reality." He elaborated: "International law is highly political. It is 'so-called' law." While he acknowledged that the principles of international humanitarian law – such as Ftion and proportionality – are "beautiful," he deemed them impractical and overly general, requiring specific adjustments.   Poleg added, "Even if Eiland's observations are accurate, what is permissible for superpowers like the United States is not permissible for Israel. As a small country with limited capabilities, we cannot act as though 'a people that shall dwell alone,' ignoring global public opinion and its political ramifications."   Eiland argued that the application of these principles is inherently political. "The so-called investigation committees write according to international law, but it's all a farce." Reflecting on the First Intifada, during which Poleg served as the first Gaza Commander, Eiland critiqued the detailed opening fire instructions, stating that "they were overly prescriptive." He noted that during the Second Intifada, these instructions were revised as necessary. According to Eiland, soldiers in the field must have significant autonomy: "Instructions should aim for the lowest common denominator." He acknowledged the inherent dilemma in uncertain situations: "The decision to shoot is a choice between necessity and error." Ultimately, he said, "the outcome of such decisions depends on who is conducting the investigation." Eiland dismissed the idea of a universal moral standard, asserting instead that military actions must be judged comparatively: "We must consider the practices of other armies. To my knowledge, other armies shoot less accurately than we do."   Eiland highlighted the IDF Air Force's use of precision weapons in Gaza, calling it "a reflection of resource allocation," noting that "under normal combat conditions, one should not skimp on ammunition, even if it is inaccurate and inexpensive." He concluded that "the Dahiya operation was highly effective," expressing support for similar strategies in future conflicts.   It is interesting to note that Eiland stated in this conversation, ten years ago, that "the Prime Minister, the Minister of Defense, and the Chief of Staff are one. The political echelon must make military considerations, just as the military echelon must make political considerations." He further asserted, "There is no hierarchy in considerations, despite the fact that the political echelon is in charge."   In his autobiographical book, Can't Sleep at Night  (Hebrew, 2018), Eiland wrote: "Only a strategy that produces multiple events of the 'Dahiya effect' type will ensure that campaigns are short, and that Israel emerges victorious." According to him, one possible course of action is "the complete occupation of the entire Gaza Strip, which would serve the broader goal of toppling the Hamas regime." This approach, he argued, "requires the occupation of the entire Gaza Strip and holding it for an extended period, until a different political reality emerges."   Returning to the article in "Haaretz Supplement," Eiland's (relatively moderated) statements reflect his consistent worldview, expressed in the first person: "I give food and water to those who leave and set a certain date, beyond which, whoever decides not to leave does so at their own risk. The entire northern Gaza Strip becomes a military zone, which I can attack because, as far as I'm concerned, only the enemy remains there."   Eiland argued: "All Hamas is trying to do is mix the population with the fighters. All we need to do is the opposite: separate them." He claimed, unfoundedly, that "only terrorists will remain in this area."   On this matter, after conducting an in-depth study of "Military Law and Ethics" (as Knowledge Manager in the Field of Sniping at the Counter-Terrorism School of the IDF, and a member of the Shalom Hartman Institute's Applied Military Ethics Research Team (headed by Prof. Avi Sagi), I have concluded without a doubt that the principle of distinction between combatants and non-combatants or civilians is paramount and non-negotiable. This principle forms the cornerstone of the Law of War. It is imperative to recognize that the distinction between combatants and non-combatants or civilians is obligatory in every situation, at all times. Under no circumstances should we assume that certain areas are devoid of civilians. When operating in civilian environments, it is highly probable that civilians will remain in the vicinity for various reasons. The assumption of "sterile areas" (what Eiland refers to as "clean areas") requires a robust and factual basis. Such assumptions cannot absolve combatants from the responsibility of implementing the principle of distinction. The moral responsibility for ensuring this lies with every commander and every soldier engaged in combat.   Eiland has also spoken explicitly about "starvation" as a military tactic. In the past, he suggested that, after a week, the population in a given area would face the choice of "surrendering or starving." In an interview with "Haaretz Supplement," he expressed regret over this "unfortunate" statement, claiming to have learned from the experience. However, he maintained that "it is permissible and even advisable to starve an enemy population," based on the [incorrect] assumption that this becomes legitimate after civilians are allowed to leave.   Regarding this assumption, the Jewish-American philosopher Michael Walzer, an authority on the ethics of warfare and author of Just and Unjust Wars: A Moral Argument with Historical Illustrations  (1977), observed that the American experience during the Vietnam War demonstrates that, even with adequate warnings, many people do not leave. This could be due to age, illness, fear of looting, lack of alternative refuge, or because insurgents deliberately prevent their departure to use them as human shields.   Eiland's analogy of "humanitarian for humanitarian" in such conflicts equates a democratic state's responsibilities with those of a "state" governed by a terrorist organization. His assertion that "the people of Gaza are like the people of Nazi Germany – where the entire population supports the leader" and his comparison of Hamas to a more entrenched force than ISIS are concerning. Such rhetoric risks fueling extremist agendas and poses potential dangers to Israeli society and the state. It is unsurprising that some of Eiland's closest associates have remarked that he has aligned himself with far-right figures like Bezalel Smotrich.   While certain elements on the right championed the adoption of the " Israeli generals' plan " for their own reasons, the Prime Minister faced significant political and diplomatic challenges in navigating these demands. During a meeting with the U.S. Secretary of State in late October 2024, American officials suggested that Israel's isolation of northern Gaza and the withholding of essential supplies constituted harmful policy. Both the Prime Minister and the Minister of Strategic Affairs, Ron Dermer, denied this, asserting: "This is not our policy. The notion that such actions have been implemented has caused us great harm."   Nevertheless, Eiland's controversial remarks have had lasting repercussions. The International Criminal Court (ICC) in The Hague issued a preliminary summary indicating "reasonable basis to assume" that Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and former Defense Minister Yoav Gallant are responsible for "starvation as a method of warfare." The summary alleges that they "intentionally and knowingly deprived the civilian population of Gaza of essential survival equipment, including food, water, medicine, medical supplies, fuel, and electricity." Arrest warrants have been kept secret to protect witnesses and preserve the investigation's integrity.   Zvi Poleg  summarized the situation in our recent conversation: "Our continued presence in the West Bank today stems from political, not military, considerations. The IDF has informed the political echelon that its mission in the area is complete. Now is the time to declare a ceasefire and reach an agreement. The primary reason for remaining in the West Bank is the political leverage it offers Prime Minister Netanyahu's coalition, particularly ministers from Otzma Yehudit and Habayit Hayehudi, to maintain his rule. The longer we stay, the more we entangle ourselves in establishing an Israeli control mechanism over the population. Unlike in Lebanon, where the Lebanese government remains responsible for refugees and humanitarian conditions despite our presence, in Gaza, continued Israeli occupation creates a governance vacuum, leaving sole responsibility for the humanitarian crisis on our shoulders."   Regarding the possibility that the situation will be exploited politically to establish Jewish settlements in the Gaza Strip, Poleg acknowledges that the establishment of military infrastructure (such as roads, outposts, etc.) – intended for the army's preparations for its ongoing presence in the area, especially during the winter months – could potentially be used in the future to facilitate the establishment of 'messianic' civilian elements in the region. In his view, if such settlements were established in the near future, they might not pose an immediate security threat, given the severe damage inflicted on terrorist organizations and the substantial IDF presence in the area. However, in the long term, these settlements would face increasing threats and could become a significant burden on the state and the security establishment.   Poleg asserts that "the IDF does not have the appropriate capacity and resources to control the Gaza Strip over time." Regarding the " Israeli generals' plan ," he considers it "unrealistic" and believes it "contradicts international law." Poleg argues – as I have also suggested above – that "a democratic state cannot force a population to evacuate and declare a specific area a 'closed military area' indefinitely." He emphasizes the "humanitarian responsibility of an occupying military force toward the civilian population" and highlights the "prohibition against permanently displacing the occupied population."   On the decision of the Hague Criminal Court, Poleg draws a distinction between the responsibility of the political echelon and that of the IDF – a distinction he believes Eiland fails to make. According to Poleg, "When the government does not define its objectives with regard to the Palestinian Authority, refuses to recognize the Palestinian Authority, fails to decide who should govern the Palestinian Authority, and obstructs UNRWA [ The United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees ] activity – the IDF acts as correctly as possible in accordance with the directives of the political echelon."   He noted that officers in the permanent ranks of the IDF are trained to carry out the instructions of the political echelon without question, to maintain silence, and to execute its orders, out of concern for preserving the democratic structure of government in the country. However, he qualifies this by emphasizing that this does not mean senior IDF officers are mere "yes-men." In closed forums, they candidly present their professional opinions, but once a decision is made, they justify it within the ranks and act accordingly.   In this context, it is noteworthy that Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu's current military secretary, Major General Roman Gofman, holds a different perspective. In an article on "Theatre of Military Leaders", Gofman argued that "the security echelon has a broader responsibility than merely fulfilling tasks defined by the political echelon. A commander must possess strategic vision, influence policymaking, and navigate even in situations where no clear policy has been established."   Preseted to the author by Zvi Poleg Dr. Idan Yaron, a sociologist and social anthropologist, specializes in military studies and military ethics, among other areas. His upcoming book (co-authored with Uzi Barzilai and Avi Friedman), The Undercover Unit Samson: Dealing Directly with Wanted Persons in the Gaza Strip , is set to be published soon by Maarachot-Modan.

Video clip: "We Are Soldiers", featured on the "Hilltop News" page.   "Soldiers of the House of David!When Jews step up to do what the IDF was meant to do – strike the enemy who hides their crimes and drive them away – we stand with them and pledge our support. We will not pursue them for their actions." 💪 We urge the soldiers: Share more videos like this! This is how the IDF can evolve into a truly victorious army. Jewish soldiers have declared their commitment to differentiating between Israel and its enemies, vowing to act solely in the interest of the people of Israel. This is my morality. 👍 Courtesy of IDF Spokesperson

"The State of Israel, alongside the entire world, yearns for moral clarity – clarity that can effectively suppress global evil while fostering the vibrant, life-affirming forces of those who seek freedom and justice." (Finance Minister Bezalel Smotrich, in his remarks celebrating the inauguration of President Donald Trump). Photography: Idan Yaron

"I am fully aware that what I write will upset those I am pointing at. They will leverage the tools provided by the prevailing public atmosphere in the State of Israel today to try to silence me. However, I cannot remain silent… The term 'Hilltop Youth' has lost all semblance of meaning. We are dealing with the 'Horror Youth,' operating in areas where the State of Israel holds security responsibility. If we do not act immediately to put an end to these displays of violence and lynchings, we will all bear responsibility for the consequences." (Former Prime Minister of Israel, Ehud Olmert) באדיבות "שומרים שתיקה"

There was no "genocide" in Gaza, despite the high number of dead and injured. Israel in general, and the IDF in particular, did not act with the aim of "eliminating entire religious, ethnic or political groups," and there was no intention to "destroy the [Palestinian] group as an entity."   There was probably no "ethnic cleansing" in Gaza, "as a result of which citizens of certain groups are prevented from returning to the areas from which they were expelled."   However, "domicide" (house/murder) apparently took place in the Gaza Strip. The term describes the deliberate destruction of civilian infrastructure in a given area, in order to make it uninhabitable for civilians.   In the Swords of Iron War, 60 percent of the houses in the Gaza Strip were destroyed or damaged (74 percent in Gaza City itself). This included the destruction of entire neighborhoods. Schools, hospitals, mosques, cemeteries, shops and offices were repeatedly hit, from the air and from the ground.   This is a greater destruction in fewer months than what Bashar al-Assad's army has inflicted on the city of Aleppo, Syria, during the three years of fighting in the region (during which, starting in February 2016, some 500 residents have been killed, tens of thousands have become refugees).   Similarly, Israel has dropped more ammunition on Gaza in a few weeks than the United States dropped on Afghanistan (in the war initiated by the United States following the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks) in an entire year.   Legal experts are seeking to define "domicide" as a "war crime." Such a definition, if and when accepted, would apply to both the Israeli political and military echelons. Permission: Activestills.org